LA's Bluff: TOWARDS A PNG FOREIGN POLICY WHITE PAPER: A Strategic and Project management approach

(Parts of the preface of my book, published in December, 2021)

What’s in a name?

So, what is a Foreign Policy? For the laymen, it is a National Government’s combine strategies, or general objectives, to effectively manage its international relations with other countries, either bilaterally, or multilaterally. It also affects domestic policies due to the intricacies of globalization. Its main objective is to use diplomacy – talking, meeting, negotiating, and making agreements – to solve international problems, and to keep those problems from developing into conflicts that may require military settlements. In many countries today, this role is usually the primary responsibility of the President, or the Prime Minister.

But simply put, I see it as just another glorified name for a “Game Plan”, albeit, with international relations connotations, and flavors. Indeed, the mere mention of the word “Foreign Policy” makes the unaware tremble, thinking that anything to do with it, remains in the domain of the suave, smartly dressed, internationally-savvy, Foreign Service Officer, and diplomat, or those with the title of Ambassador, and/or High Commissioner, whose prime task on earth is to travel the world for seemingly “unknown high-level” reasons.

Rightly so too. Dihm and Wolfers, in their 1989 publication, correctly stated that “Foreign Policy is a notoriously elusive concept because a number of factors combine, to blur the distinction between foreign, and domestic policies. These include, the domestic requirements and effects of globalization, the growing spread and depth of international cooperation, and the increasing domestic acceptance, and application of international law, which again, affect all areas of public policy and their implementation in PNG”[1].

Other aspects of policy formulation that continuously blur this concept are Papua New Guinea’s engagements as a global citizen (promoting peace and cooperation), the significant elements of defence cooperation it has with its neighbors, and its relationships to international organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, ADB, ACP group, the Commonwealth, APEC, and the UN systems, as well as the functional, or commodity defined organizations, through which cocoa, coffee, natural rubber, and tropical timber-producing countries cooperate.

For a small developing economy such as ours, this has continued to be the downfall of our bureaucracy in effectively coordinating its formulation, and implementation, through a Whole-of-Government-Approach. There are a lot of variables at play here, chiefly among them, the required capacity to understand and implement these new undertakings, as against the continuous protection of one’s fiefs which leads to working in silos. Which is the main reason why the Department of PMNEC must take carriage of all such undertakings to ensure compatibility within the whole public service machinery.

Since 1975, many professionally qualified, conversant, and academically knowledgeable persons have written extensively on this subject; most have contributed productively to the formulation of our post-independence Foreign Policy of “Friends to all, enemy to none”. They did so again, from 1979 until 1981, when this inaugural Foreign Policy was reviewed, adjusted, and upgraded to one of “Active and Selective Engagement” to support the advances it had made in the first five years of its nationhood. It was also converted into a White Paper, which remains to today, as the only White Paper written for this purpose. This was then followed less than a decade later by the “Look North” Foreign Policy, and quickly thereafter, the “Look North, and Work the Pacific” initiatives.

For the next three decades, respective Foreign Ministers have presented Foreign Policy Statements to Parliament, as their signature intervention, at the expense of another, albeit, formal Foreign Policy White Paper, which to this day (at the time of the writing of this book) is work in progress. Nearly all these statements, reflecting the personality of the political leaders that defined them, have been mostly ambiguous, and ad hoc, lacking that required bureaucratic support, and capacity, to operationalize them into an actual Foreign Policy White Paper, and their accompanying strategic plans to operationalize and drive them internationally, and domestically.

Despite this prolonged lag in this process, an opportunity came a knocking in 2018 when PNG had the honor and privilege of playing host to the year-long APEC process. Hosting APEC was Papua New Guinea’s biggest ever foreign policy exercise, and crowning glory, since 1975. It laid the foundation for the government (including the bureaucracy) upon which a new Foreign Policy White Paper could have been developed and submitted to Parliament for endorsement, in the face of the Asian Century, and the raging US-China trade war. Still, what emanated out of this, instead, was the PNG Foreign Policy on APEC.

Because my definition of a “Foreign Policy” is a simple Game plan to advance a country’s international relations engagement in a particular direction, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Policy on APEC, was formulated in that very manner. It basically mapped out how PNG would engage in the APEC process by synergizing the outputs and inputs of the MTDPIII, and ensuing MTDPs into the APEC process. It set its eyes on the targeted goal of the PNGDSP (2010-2030) as its lighthouse.

This was an initiative, initiated by the PNG APEC Secretariat, working on the post-APEC 2018 directives of the NEC, who, in its Decision No: 422/2018 “directed that relevant Sectoral Ministers effectively take note of the various outcomes contained in the Chair’s Era Kone Statement, including the APEC Action Agenda on Digital Economy, as well as the outcomes stemming from the bilateral meetings that the Prime Minister had with various APEC Leaders, and work closely with their Departmental heads, to “devise Work plans” to implement these arrangements, and report back to the NEC, in a timely manner, on progress.”

Following on from this, Prime Minister James Marape, upon consideration of this Submission, with his Cabinet, , endorsed the “Roadmap to domesticate the APEC 2018 Chair’s Era Kone Statement”. In this same Cabinet Decision No. 36/2020, they also approved the Roadmap’s “Selective Engagement” approach, as Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Policy on APEC” . . .

Which brings me to the issue of our core values.

Papua New Guinea’s core values are enshrined in its Constitution through the Five (5) National Goals and Directive Principles. These should be the pillars upon which policymakers can map out an appropriate Game Plan in a . . .

With the New Normal, all “bets are now considered off”. Meaning, the traditional norms of foreign policy formulation . . .

Mitigating the pandemic

Prime Minister James Marape, in one of his statements, late in 2020, informed PNG that it would now need to adjust to the new normal, and learn to live with the existence of Covid-19. This meant adjusting to a new way of living and going about our lives, work, and interactions with people . . .

Hovering above all these opportunities, is the digital factor . . .

Legislating a Foreign Policy?

The five National Goals and Directive Principles underwrote the modern nation of PNG. (Kari, 2009). Their respective visions compelled post-independence governments to deliver social, economic, and political development with considerations for equality, national sovereignty, and economic self-reliance, protection of the natural environment, and PNG culture and institution. Sadly, despite their integration in the National Constitution of PNG, they were either ignored, or given passing acknowledgements by successive governments. (This is evident in the lack of a Foreign Policy White Paper since the last one was delivered in 1982).

Using these five National Goals and Directive Principles as a guide, the government must now move to make . . .

There is no mention of International Relations, nor Foreign Policy, in the National Constitution, although Section 117 - on Treaties - provides some resemblance of this need. However, is this sufficient? . . .

The book has been divided into three parts.

Part 1 will discuss what we have in our pantry, for want of a better word, to use internationally, to advance our interests. This includes Papua New Guinea’s recent economic outlook, and the business environment in the face of COVID-19, and why it is now necessary to make that move from the current state, to the future state, using a newly formulated Foreign Policy White Paper, and its accompanying Roadmap. This future state is now critical due to the megatrends affecting international relations at the moment.

Part 2 will describe the strategic management of Papua New Guinea’s foreign policy undertakings from independence in 1975, up to 2020, and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and how PNG has fared, domestically, and internationally, during this period. It contains the chapters that describe the journey PNG made from independence while navigating the foreign policy sandbox. Chapter 2 describes how our inaugural Foreign Policy was formulated at Independence. It discusses how a foreign policy was built upon the premises of building relationships and security alliances, with no real focus on trade. It also discusses Papua New Guinea’s early interactions with the outside world.

Chapter 3 then talks about the first Foreign Policy review in 1979, and the progress of Papua New Guinea’s forage into international trade and investment undertakings, and the involvement of regional power plays to secure its rich natural resources. It also mentions the outcome of this review exercise: The formulation of Papua New Guinea’s only Foreign Policy White Paper to date. Chapter 4 then brings to light the political instability and Papua New Guinea’s first hurdle in shifting its Foreign Policy away from its traditional obligations to its former metropole, and into the greater, and wider wilderness, while Chapter 5 talks about Prime Minister Wingti’s first foreign policy undertaking on an “Independent Commitment to International Cooperation”, and and the factors that led to his now renowned Look North policy. Prime Minister Wingti was part of that new generation of PNG leaders not part of the pre-independence movement.

Chapter 6 expands further the Look North policy, and looks at Papua New Guinea’s undertakings to connect further in a globalized world. It introduces the Statement made by Foreign Minister Samuel Abal to Parliament on 18 March, 2009, on Foreign Policy, Development, and Globalization, which in effect, commenced the long road to the ongoing Foreign Policy review. Chapter 7 then discusses the outcomes of these series of review exercises, culminating with Foreign Minister Pato’s Parliamentary Statement on “PNG Connect”, in 2013.

Part 3 of this book will continue with Chapter 8 and discuss the advantages of using Project Management tools, processes, and techniques, and the Organizational Project Management (OPM) Framework, in particular, to formulate, and draft, a Foreign Policy White Paper, and its drivers. This will then be followed by Chapter 9, to discuss future trends in PNG Foreign Policy formulation, and how a Foreign Policy White Paper should be drafted, using the PNG Foreign Policy on APEC, and its driver, the Roadmap, as baselines. The PNG Foreign Policy on APEC (PNGFPA2030) has also been included here as the Annex.

Finally, the book will urge the immediate drafting of this Foreign Policy White Paper by the responsible departments and agencies, and consequently, its tabling for Parliament’s endorsement by the incoming Government in 2022. In a nutshell, the book looks at how Strategic Management, and Project Management, can be synchronized, and used concurrently, to drive the government’s national development agendas at all levels.

One will note that half of any country’s foreign relations is basically centered around trade, and investment. This has been an ongoing dilemma with Papua New Guinea’s foreign policy formulation, due to capacity, and the very ordinary levels of cooperation between government and the private sector. When it comes to trade and investment, the role of government tends to be limited to negotiating, participating in, and monitoring compliance with international agreements, regulation, and promotion. The substance of trade and investment, in a market economy, like Papua New Guinea’s, are primarily matters for the private sector, whether or not they come under the Department of Foreign Affairs, or another agency (or agencies), as far as government policy is concerned[7].

This book is not written as an essay, to discuss the advantages and or disadvantages of a Foreign Policy White Paper. Nor is it a dissertation on Foreign Policy formulation, although it can be used as one, by budding international relations students. As such, the reader will not be directed to a myriad of discourses provided on the subject by learned experts and academics. The Chapters leading up to the actual model of implementation have been written purposely to provide the reader with the necessary and salient historical benchmarks, to rationalize the critical need for a Foreign Policy White Paper that must now be drafted, and tabled for approval, as soon as the newly elected Parliament reconvenes for the 2022-2027 parliamentary cycle. Further, it will also justify why the use of project management processes, tools, and techniques, are necessary, in this time, and age, to achieve tangible, and non-tangible outcomes of the initiatives listed down in the prescribed activities, as envisaged strategically, at the highest level.

As such, it is focused directly on how the lack of capacity in the functional organizations that make up the PNG bureaucracy, has continued to require the initiative to grasp the ideal opportunity provided by APEC PNG 2018 to formalize a Foreign Policy White Paper, in the immediate years, after the host year. It then expounds the urgent need to move quickly into formulating one, using the model provided in the PNG Foreign Policy on APEC, in order to make use of all these opportunities now provided by the onset of the New Normal.

The reader will note that the 1982 Foreign Policy White Paper on “Active and Selective Engagement”, upon its endorsement, made it clear that, far from providing guidelines for immediate implementation, it proposed an evolutionary approach by outlining a basis for ongoing policy-making (it was intended to help generate policy, from time to time, not to provide a detailed blueprint for implementation). Thus: the objectives were to be kept under continuous review, and adapted as Papua New Guinea’s internal and external circumstances changed; and that such reviews were to be facilitated by the basic approach (Papua New Guinea 1982, 19).

The advent of the pandemic has now changed this dynamic. A detailed blueprint is now required. PNG, after lengthy reviews of this Foreign Policy, since 1982, must now take stock of its interests, and move accordingly in the New Normal, as its bilateral, and development partners, the world over, are scrambling to do. This means coming up with revised and/or new strategies to mitigate the effects of COVID-19.

The PNG Foreign Policy on APEC, and its driver, the “Roadmap to implement the domestication of the APEC 2018 Chair’ Era Kone Statement, endorsed by Cabinet in 2020, through its Decision 36/2020,” moves away from the traditional model of open-ended foreign policy formulation, or waterfall approach. Instead, it provides a new model proposing the use of Project Management processes, tools, and techniques, for the sole purpose of achieving the nominated targets envisaged at the highest strategic levels.